Channel Edge Fades, Active Research Lags: Who Can Fill ICBC Credit Suisse's Equity Gap?

Deep News
Sep 15

The greatest moat for bank-affiliated fund firms lies in distribution channels, yet in the long run, that moat only moves products, it cannot substitute for research, talent, or risk control.

Leveraging the vast nationwide branch network of its major shareholder, ICBC, ICBC Credit Suisse stands as a representative institution among bank-backed fund managers. Its total assets under management have climbed to 2.56 trillion yuan, with pension operations ranking among the industry's top tier. According to the most recent financial disclosures, profit growth has been robust; net profit for the full year of 2025 surpassed 3 billion yuan, and net profit in the first half of 2026 reached another record high, placing the firm's profitability in the industry's premier league.

A closer look at the data, however, reveals a notable contradiction behind these impressive revenue and profit figures. Several once-celebrated active equity funds, including those led by star manager Zhao Bei, have suffered deep and prolonged drawdowns, leaving millions of holders trapped at high price levels. Simultaneously, veteran equity research talent has been departing in waves, causing repeated upheaval in the core team. The model built on leveraging banking traffic is finding it increasingly difficult to sidestep its weaknesses in active investment research. As the channel dividend peaks, three pressures—product performance, the talent system, and internal governance—are converging, presenting this leading firm with an unavoidable trial.

Deep Drawdowns in Flagship Products and Controversy Over Style Drift

According to the operational data for ICBC Credit Suisse disclosed in ICBC's annual report, the company achieved a net profit of 3.007 billion yuan in 2025, up 42.5% year-on-year. In the first half of 2026, this growth momentum accelerated further. Semi-annual data shows net profit of 2.218 billion yuan during that period, an increase of approximately 27% year-on-year, placing it among the top three fund companies that have published operating figures, and at the leading edge among bank-affiliated institutions. By the end of June, total assets under management across all categories had reached 2.56 trillion yuan, an increase of over 180 billion yuan from the start of the year, ranking among the top in terms of growth for bank-affiliated firms. The firm manages 285 public funds and 691 asset portfolios.

The business model, which charges management fees based on asset scale, means ICBC Credit Suisse can rely on its massive existing base to generate steady income. Even as the net asset values of many of its active equity funds decline, the company's profits continue to grow rapidly. This highlights an increasingly stark contradiction: the company is profitable while investors suffer losses.

The most representative example is Zhao Bei, once hailed as the "Medicine Goddess." Her two flagship products—ICBC Frontier Medical Equity A and ICBC Growth Select Mixed A—exemplify the issue. In 2021, during the booming healthcare market, Zhao Bei gained fame for her precise positioning in CXO and innovative drug sectors. At its peak, a single product she managed held over 20 billion yuan, attracting a flood of investors drawn in by the narrative of being "bullish on the healthcare sector long-term," many of whom bought at elevated prices expecting to share in the industry's growth dividend.

However, once the market tide receded, a prolonged decline began. By August 2026, the net asset value of ICBC Frontier Medical Equity A stood at approximately 3.56 yuan, nearly 30% below its historical high of 5.07 yuan in May 2021. Investors who bought above 3.8 yuan are still nursing losses of over 20%, while those who entered above 4 yuan face even deeper unrealized losses. Adding to the market controversy, the 2025 annual report shows that Zhao Bei had liquidated all of her self-purchased holdings in this fund. The redemption timing coincided closely with a rebound peak in the healthcare sector in September that year. Many long-suffering investors lament, "The fund manager redeemed first, leaving us still holding the bag."

An even more contentious product is ICBC Growth Select Mixed A. Launched in March 2021, this hit fund attracted massive inflows at its initial offering. In Q1 2021, the fund's holdings were entirely medical stocks, and the market widely anticipated results from its deep cultivation of the healthcare industry. Yet, in Q2 2026, Zhao Bei dramatically reshuffled the portfolio, selling off a significant portion of medical stocks and pivoting heavily toward technology sectors like AI and semiconductors—a substantial style drift. Notably, shortly after completing this shift, the healthcare sector experienced a rebound while tech stocks pulled back quickly. Within just over twenty days, the fund's NAV fell from around 0.80 yuan to below 0.63 yuan, a single-month decline of nearly 20%. By the end of August, the fund had accumulated losses since inception, leaving holders trapped. Many investors expressed that they had bought the fund specifically for Zhao Bei's years of experience in the healthcare sector, never expecting her to chase trends outside her circle of competence and expose them to risks beyond their expectations.

Beyond these two star products, several other equity funds under ICBC Credit Suisse display a pattern of "slow gains, fast losses." Some balanced and growth-style funds have persistently underperformed their performance benchmarks over the past one and three years. Investors pay management fees of around 1.5% annually, only to receive subpar long-term returns. An increasingly apparent issue confronts the market: while strong bank channels can sell products, they cannot guarantee subsequent investment returns. Traffic can create short-term hits but cannot sustain fund NAV over the long haul. With roughly 75% of the company's public fund scale concentrated in fixed-income and money-market products, overall revenue and profit are stabilized, but this also signals that the market is voting with its feet; ordinary investors are growing increasingly wary of this veteran institution's active equity capabilities.

Veteran Equity Talent Exodus Highlights the Platform Model's Talent Crunch

A common consensus in the public fund industry is that talent is the most critical asset. A fund company's ability to consistently generate returns for its holders depends heavily on retaining a mature and stable research and investment team. In recent years, ICBC Credit Suisse has been experiencing a pronounced wave of talent attrition. From equity investment to FOF asset allocation, senior experts across multiple business lines have successively departed. Even as the company emphasizes that over 70% of its fund managers are internally cultivated, the impact of losing seasoned core staff is hard to ignore.

The departure that saddened the market most was Yuan Fang, once dubbed the "Number One in Equities." Yuan Fang had served at ICBC Credit Suisse for over a decade, managing multiple multi-billion-yuan mixed funds and gaining a large following for her balanced growth style. However, she left at the end of 2022. Soon after, Jiang Hua'an, the leading figure in the FOF business, also resigned, simultaneously stepping down from managing nine FOF products. Jiang, who had previously worked with the National Social Security Fund, was among the earliest domestic experts in retirement target funds and asset allocation. His exit disrupted the development pace of ICBC Credit Suisse's FOF business. The team that took over consists mostly of young managers with limited tenure; some had less than a year of experience managing public funds when they assumed their roles, and subsequently, several pension FOF products began experiencing notable performance volatility.

The head of the Equity Investment Department, Zhang Yufan, also left later. As a core leader for growth investment, his departure weakened the firm's research strength in technology and high-end manufacturing. Wang Xiaoling, a veteran in the consumer sector, along with several senior industry researchers, also departed, creating gaps across multiple industry research lines. In 2026, the talent drain has accelerated. In August alone, three fund managers—Xia Yu, Yan Yao, and He Xiuhong—each with over five years of experience, left in succession. By the end of August for the full year, nine fund managers had exited ICBC Credit Suisse, several of whom were seasoned professionals who had managed products worth billions of yuan.

Industry analysts believe that the frequent talent turnover is closely tied to ICBC Credit Suisse's heavily bank-oriented, platform-style management approach. Unlike many market-oriented public funds that adopt business unit structures, equity incentives, and more flexible assessment mechanisms, ICBC Credit Suisse's management system carries a strong imprint of its banking parent. Many managers come from the ICBC system, with assessments emphasizing compliance, processes, and channel sales metrics, leaving limited room for incentives tied to long-term research performance. Many senior researchers and fund managers feel they must expend significant energy on internal procedures, marketing roadshows, and channel communication, squeezing time needed for deep due diligence and refining investment frameworks. When private funds or other public managers offer more attractive terms, leaving becomes a natural choice.

To fill the gaps, the company has had to keep promoting new talent. Although the firm claims that over 70% of its fund managers are self-cultivated and bring energy, most have not experienced a full bull-bear cycle. In times of sharp market volatility, they are prone to chasing highs and selling lows, swayed by short-term market sentiment. Zhao Bei's dramatic sector switches and her pursuit of the AI trend, to some extent, reflect a broader restlessness within the firm's research culture.

The biggest moat for a bank-affiliated fund company is its channels, but in the long term, that moat only helps sell products; it cannot replace research, talent, or risk control. ICBC Credit Suisse, powered by a steady stream of ICBC traffic, has secured substantial management fee income with rising profits. Yet, if it cannot retain top investment research talent, stabilize the long-term performance of its funds, and embed compliance and risk control into every operational detail, even the most impressive financial figures may lack lasting support. The core purpose of the asset management industry is to be entrusted with others' money and manage it on their behalf. Ultimately, all business models and channel advantages must translate into reasonable long-term returns for holders. For ICBC Credit Suisse, balancing short-term sales scale against long-term holder returns, balancing bank-style stable processes against market-driven research incentives, and balancing traffic growth against internal governance will be the defining challenges in the years ahead.

Disclaimer: Investing carries risk. This is not financial advice. The above content should not be regarded as an offer, recommendation, or solicitation on acquiring or disposing of any financial products, any associated discussions, comments, or posts by author or other users should not be considered as such either. It is solely for general information purpose only, which does not consider your own investment objectives, financial situations or needs. TTM assumes no responsibility or warranty for the accuracy and completeness of the information, investors should do their own research and may seek professional advice before investing.

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