This report examines the macroeconomic landscape and government bond market for the fourth quarter, forecasting a gradual cooling in U.S. growth while domestic investment finds its footing. Key drivers include AI capex resilience, geopolitical inflation pressures, and a shift toward precision monetary policy tools.

Key Takeaways

U.S. economic growth is expected to decline quarter by quarter in the second half, though the overall pace should hold near a steady 2%. Third-quarter growth is projected at approximately 2.3%, easing to 2% in the fourth quarter.

Domestically, fixed asset investment is likely to stabilize and recover in the fourth quarter, supported by stronger infrastructure funding, helping meet the annual growth target.

On the policy front, fiscal policy will retain flexibility, with room to deploy incremental tools if domestic demand pressure intensifies. Monetary policy will remain cautious on aggregate measures, focusing instead on precise hedging and structural support.

For the bond market, the 10-year government bond yield is expected to trade within a 1.60%-1.75% range in the fourth quarter, with a bias toward buying on dips.

U.S. Economy: Investment Offsets Headwinds While Geopolitics and Inflation Force Tighter Policy

In the second quarter of 2026, U.S. growth slowed to 1.5% due to a drag from rising imports weighing on net exports. However, the underlying structure remained solid, with personal consumption and private investment growing 3.2% and 3% respectively, effectively cushioning external volatility. Within non-residential investment, AI-related spending drove computer equipment output to maintain year-on-year growth above 40%, while manufacturing-related investment, aided by a lower base, saw its annualized quarterly rate plunge to -21.5% — a 15-year low. This highlights a widening divergence, with robust AI investment still serving as a critical pillar of support.

Since the second quarter, AI computing supply in the U.S. has remained tight, with GPU utilization at major North American cloud providers exceeding 80% — and over 90% at Oracle and Meta. As demand for computing power continues to outpace supply expansion, these providers have further raised their annual capex plans, now up roughly 103% on average versus 2025. Microsoft revised its capex downward due to an accounting policy change extending data center depreciation, though actual spending still exceeded $190 billion. Meanwhile, U.S. tech issuance has surged, with investment-grade corporate bond issuance up 30.7% year-to-date through August, versus 10.4% in 2025. According to Citi, dollar bond issuance from the five major cloud providers, NVIDIA, and SpaceX has surpassed $200 billion — more than double the 2025 total. Since AI capital budgets typically concentrate execution in the second half, data center construction accelerated in July with a 57.2% year-on-year gain. With the four major cloud vendors having completed only slightly more than 40% of their semi-annual capex plans, second-half AI investment intensity is set to rise notably.

Manufacturing sentiment has broadly improved, with the ISM index holding above 54% in July-August — a four-year high — and output, new orders, and employment components all stronger than in the first half. Yet the structure tells a different story: equipment and construction output tied to AI infrastructure has outpaced overall industrial production. Excluding high-tech, motor vehicles, and parts, manufacturing output growth has lagged the broader measure. Industrial production growth fell 1.1 percentage points to 1.08% in July, marking two consecutive monthly declines since May, while construction output jumped to 2.42% from 1.03% in June. Equipment output eased to 6.59% from June's post-second-quarter high of 6.84%, and industrial production excluding computers, communications equipment, and semiconductors grew just 0.85% — the lowest since the second quarter. The improvement in manufacturing sentiment is thus largely AI-driven, with non-AI industries continuing to weaken.

Capacity utilization remains low — 76.29% across all industries and 76.01% in manufacturing in July, both below their 1972-2025 averages of 79.41% and 78.19% — dampening the urgency for new investment. Additionally, since July, renewed geopolitical tensions and rising inflation expectations have pushed 10-year Treasury yields above 5% by mid-September, up nearly 60 basis points from end-June. Higher rates raise financing costs and project hurdles, cooling investment appetite. Core capital goods orders, a leading indicator, rose just 0.2% month-on-month in July, a sharp drop from June's 1.7%.

Residential investment rebounded in the second quarter following the new housing law, with annualized quarterly growth swinging from -7.8% to 1.3%. The law's prohibition on large institutional investors acquiring single-family homes pushed them toward multifamily and rental properties. However, new home sales have remained negative year-on-year through 2026, accelerating their decline as mortgage rates climb. July new home sales fell 10.47% month-on-month — the second-largest drop this year — down 6.33% year-on-year. Inventory pressure is building, with months of supply rising to 9.6 months in July, the highest since May 2025. With 30-year fixed mortgage rates exceeding 7% by mid-September amid renewed U.S.-Iran tensions, affordability has deteriorated further — housing costs already consumed 44% of typical household income in July, well above the 30% affordability threshold. Builder confidence sank to 34 in July, a yearly low, before edging to 35 in August — still near fourth-quarter 2025 levels. The rebound in residential investment appears unsustainable given weak supply-demand dynamics and poor sentiment.

Consumer Resilience Frays as Growth Momentum Shifts Lower

Consumer momentum has slowed noticeably since mid-year as the temporary boost from the second quarter's tax rebates fades. July retail sales fell 0.5% month-on-month, the largest drop since May 2025. While August saw a modest rebound driven by autos, energy, online shopping, and back-to-school electronics and sporting goods, the composition deteriorated: discretionary categories like apparel and department stores weakened, while staples such as groceries and personal care gained. After adjusting for price increases, real growth in staples lagged the second quarter, indicating that lower-income households are compressing essential spending while middle- and upper-income groups trade down — a clear deterioration in consumption quality.

Looking ahead, mid-August's geopolitical escalation has pushed oil prices up, lifting U.S. gasoline prices to $4.30 per gallon in September — the highest since June. This has fueled cost-of-living concerns, with the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index plunging to 47.8 in September from 51.7 — near record lows — and one-year inflation expectations jumping from 4% to 4.6%. Despite robust job growth — averaging over 900,000 per month in July-August — new positions are concentrated in low-wage sectors like education, healthcare, and leisure. Real wages have been negative year-on-year since May, eroding purchasing power. The personal savings rate edged up to 3% in July but remains near four-year lows, with savings down more than 30% year-on-year, indicating households are drawing down buffers. With equity gains slowing since mid-August, the wealth effect is also fading. The fourth quarter is expected to see a systematically lower consumption growth trajectory, with geopolitics and hawkish Fed policy as headwinds. Seasonal holiday demand may provide a modest lift, suggesting a trough in early quarter followed by improvement.

Supply Shocks Lift Inflation and Force Passive Tightening

Rising geopolitical tensions have accelerated oil prices, fueling a sharp inflation rebound. August CPI rose 0.4% month-on-month, up from 0.1% in July, with energy and transportation components swinging from -1.5% and -0.6% to +2.1% and +0.5%. Core CPI excluding food and energy rose 0.3%, accelerating from 0.2%, driven by a surprise jump in telephone service prices. Elsewhere, core goods and services prices generally fell, underscoring weak demand-side price power.

The geopolitical landscape continues to deteriorate: renewed U.S.-Iran tensions in July, a Ukrainian attack on an Iranian vessel in the Caspian, an escalation in the Russia-Ukraine war in late August, and Houthi strikes on Saudi pipelines and the capture of the Red Sea port of Mukha have disrupted supply routes across the Red Sea, Black Sea, and Strait of Hormuz. Brent crude approached $110 per barrel in mid-September, up over 50% from July lows. With no quick end in sight and oil inventories near limits, supply gaps are expected to persist, keeping prices elevated and potentially pushing refined product prices higher. Domestically, AI demand has driven computer software and accessories prices up 25.4% year-on-year by August, adding to CPI pressure. August PPI accelerated to 5.4% from 4.7%, with upstream cost increases poised to feed through. Base effects from last year's fourth-quarter government shutdown — which suppressed readings to 2.7% CPI and 2.6% core — will also push year-on-year figures higher. Fourth-quarter CPI is likely to trend upward, potentially revisiting second-quarter highs.

The Fed has come under pressure as inflation expectations rise. July's hold fueled concerns about credibility, briefly sending 30-year yields soaring. Although Chair Warsh's Jackson Hole remarks reaffirmed the 2% target, calming risk premiums, renewed tensions pushed long-end yields higher. By September 15, 10- and 30-year yields reached 5% and 5.36%, up 86 and 45 basis points from end-June, while the 10-year breakeven inflation rate climbed to 2.38% from 2.28% at end-July. In September, the Fed raised rates for the first time in three years, with the median dot plot implying one more hike this year. Warsh emphasized that persistently high inflation was the core rationale — suggesting the tightening aims less at suppressing demand than at defending policy credibility, containing inflation expectations, and preventing yield de-anchoring. With energy supply shocks unlikely to ease soon, further tightening pressure looms, with inflation expectations and long-end yields as key drivers.

Overall, accelerating tech capex continues to support AI investment, underpinning the economy. With stimulus effects fading, residential investment and consumption are likely to slow. Geopolitical risk, inflation, and Fed tightening will weigh on non-AI investment and consumption. Third-quarter growth is expected to hold up, potentially edging up to 2.3% as net export and government spending drags ease. Fourth-quarter momentum should fade, cooling growth to around 2% on base effects.

Domestic Economy: Structural Repair in Fixed Investment While Aggregate Demand Stays Weak

Domestic downside pressure increased in July-August 2026, driven by extreme weather and a slower fiscal pace. Exports remained strong and monetary policy was accommodative, yet incremental policy support was slow to arrive. Consumption, property, and cyclical sectors continued to weaken, with divergence from exports, high-end manufacturing, and technology deepening. Fixed asset investment deceleration was the main brake on growth, with infrastructure investment rapidly slowing and property investment accelerating its decline — both pointing to ongoing adjustment in the construction chain. Weak demand meant rising production costs from import-driven energy prices were not fully passed through. January-August CPI and PPI rose to 0.9% and 2% year-on-year, but core CPI stayed soft and PPI showed structural divergence, indicating limited domestic demand momentum. With new policy financial instruments deployed in September, accelerated special bond issuance, and start of major "15th Five-Year Plan" projects, fourth-quarter growth is expected to quicken.

Infrastructure Funding Strengthens While Property Bottom Proves Elusive

Infrastructure investment growth has slowed sharply since the second quarter as existing projects wind down and new starts lag. April's approval reform tightened scrutiny on project returns, making local governments cautious and delaying project filings. Bond issuance shifted toward refinancing and ultra-long special bonds, with new special bond issuance reaching only 34% of the annual quota by May — well behind schedule. Issuance picked up in June but still trailed 2025. After July's Politburo meeting accelerated "six networks" construction, July-August infrastructure investment growth fell further to 14.7%. January-August special bond issuance reached 2.93 trillion yuan, or 66.5% of quota, below 2025's 74% but roughly flat with 2024. Over 1.47 trillion yuan remains for September onward, implying faster issuance. Combined with government bonds, net government financing of 5.07 trillion yuan is needed in September-December, up 1.5 trillion from last year, with September-October expected to peak at 1.4 and 1.3 trillion yuan. The new 800 billion yuan policy financial instrument, with an estimated 10-14x leverage, could support 8-11 trillion yuan in total project investment. However, with deployment starting late in Q3, some projects may be delayed to 2027 due to winter stoppages. Assuming over half of projects begin this year, fixed asset and infrastructure investment could see 3.68 trillion and 2.4 trillion yuan in support. Policy constraints and project readiness remain limiting factors, with full-year infrastructure investment growth expected at 0%-1%. While funding support strengthens in Q4, the rebound's magnitude will depend on the pace of fund deployment and construction conditions.

Property investment fell 19.9% year-on-year in January-August, with starts, construction, and completions deeply negative. Sales area and value declined 12% and 13%, respectively. Given sales typically lead investment by about six months, the downtrend will persist. The August 28 policy overhaul — reshaping sales, credit, and capital market rules — will intensify contraction across the development chain. Under a presale-to-completed-sales shift, cash flow cycles lengthen, discouraging land purchases and new starts. Credit shifting from corporate to project-level assessments ends cross-project fund transfers, while REITs favor existing assets over new development, limiting new investment. Land transactions may slow. However, grandfathering rules mean fourth-quarter investment won't collapse, as most reported investment comes from ongoing construction and land tail payments exempt from new rules. The full impact falls on 2027. Full-year property investment is expected to decline around 20%.

Manufacturing investment has cooled under pressure from rising upstream prices squeezing downstream margins, anti-involution capacity constraints, and weak demand. January-August equipment purchases grew 9.3%, slightly faster than H1, but manufacturing investment fell 2.3%, widening its decline. Export-oriented midstream equipment and AI-related manufacturing outperformed, while downstream consumer goods were weak — reflecting policy focus on high-quality supply chains and accelerating capacity exit in traditional industries. With 200 billion yuan in equipment renewal funds fully deployed by end-June, its support fades. The 800 billion yuan policy instrument targeting advanced manufacturing and a lower base from last year offer conditions for improvement. However, since self-funded investment accounts for nearly 90% of manufacturing funding, the policy instrument's capital role is limited. With capacity utilization low, firms favor improving utilization of existing assets over new capex. Manufacturing investment rebound is thus likely weaker than infrastructure, with structural repair more evident and high-tech versus traditional divergence persisting. Overall, Q4 fixed asset investment should stabilize, with infrastructure growth turning positive on stronger funding. Equipment renewal support fades, but tech self-reliance and export advantages narrow manufacturing declines. Property remains a drag, but grandfathering limits this year's hit, deferring major pressure to 2027.

Employment and Income Pressures Build as Consumption Feedback Loop Forms

Retail sales grew just 1.1% year-on-year in January-August, down 3.5 percentage points from 2025 and at historic lows, despite expanded trade-in subsidies. Auto, home appliance, furniture, building materials, communications, and jewelry categories — property-linked and subsidized — declined sharply, reflecting weak post-property-cycle demand and policy-driven demand pull-forward. Urban per-capita disposable income grew 4.4% in H1 2026, up 0.1% from 2025, yet consumer confidence has broadly recovered, with willingness and income indices above 2025. Employment, however, remains weak, with the August urban surveyed unemployment rate at 5.3%, and the yearly average trending higher than in 2024-2025. Service sector sentiment softened in July-August, indicating a strengthening "employment-income-consumption" negative feedback loop. The State Council's July approval of the "15th Five-Year Plan to Expand Consumption" provides long-term support through service consumption upgrades and goods consumption expansion. Consumption should stabilize in Q4 as the economy stabilizes and base effects fade, with recovery speed dependent on follow-up policy implementation. Key is whether fiscal spending shifts toward income support to repair household balance sheets.

AI Momentum Fades Slightly as Export Slope Gently Declines

Exports grew 19.3% year-on-year in January-August, up from 5.5% in 2025, driven by overseas manufacturing restocking, AI investment demand, and precautionary inventory builds. High-tech products and machinery have become primary drivers: August high-tech exports rose 57% year-on-year, with integrated circuits and automatic data processing equipment up 130% and 77% respectively, and machinery exports up 33%. Labor-intensive products grew 10.3%. The export mix is shifting, however. August exports to the U.S. improved on AI capex strength and tariff-driven pre-shipping, while EU and ASEAN growth slowed on high base effects. Integrated circuit export volumes fell 7.9% year-on-year despite strong value growth, suggesting high prices are curbing demand. With base effects rising in Q4 and AI capex and Philadelphia Semiconductor Index leading indicators cooling, the contribution from ICs and data equipment will weaken. Tariff measures — Section 301, EU EV countervailing duties, CBAM, and de minimis changes — are converting trade barriers from expectations into costs, likely dampening restocking. However, real demand in ASEAN, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa, along with global energy transition and supply chain substitution supporting new energy, autos, general machinery, and electrical equipment, provides resilience. Corporate overseas expansion, re-exporting, and localization also buffer single-market shocks. Fourth-quarter export growth is expected to ease from Q3, with full-year growth around 15%.

Imported Inflation Rises as Midstream Margins Squeeze

Q3 inflation showed a split pattern: CPI rising mildly to 0.8% in July-August, with core CPI hovering near 1.0%, lifted by gasoline, vegetables, eggs, and summer travel services, while durable goods like autos and appliances remained weak due to trade-in policy rollback. PPI was stronger, reaching 3.8% year-on-year in August with positive month-on-month readings. Mining, coal, and oil and gas extraction led gains, driven by global oil prices, coal and metals, and "anti-involution" supply constraints. Consumer goods prices were nearly flat, reflecting weak downstream pricing power and squeezed midstream margins. This split — upstream price recovery, downstream demand weakness — is expected to persist into Q4. CPI may hold around 1.0%-1.2% as summer service demand fades, rents and core services remain constrained by income expectations, and food price support wanes. PPI likely eases to 2.5%-3.0% as low base effects fade and commodity prices consolidate, with policy support underpinning coal, steel, and nonferrous metals, but weak downstream demand capping gains. The profit squeeze from rising input costs without matching output price increases will persist through year-end.

Policy Assessment: Cash-Flow Window Opens While Reserve Incremental Policies

Fiscal Spending Accelerates with Expanded Financial Coordination

The 2026 fiscal budget exceeds 30 trillion yuan for the first time, with new government debt of 11.89 trillion yuan — both records. However, spending has lagged: broad fiscal spending in the first eight months fell 3.5% year-on-year, well below the 4.6% full-year target. General public budget execution was 60.5%, slightly below the five-year average of 61.5%. The drag comes mainly from local governments, where government fund spending fell 17% on weak land sales. Local finances prioritize "three guarantees" (wages, operations, livelihoods), debt servicing, and resolution, squeezing new project funds. Tightened implicit debt controls prohibit advances on projects. Lagging special bond issuance and insufficient quality project reserves create delays from bond proceeds to physical work, with stricter fund supervision slowing disbursement. Credit data show continued balance sheet contraction for households and enterprises, indicating insufficient fiscal transmission. With Q3 bond funds now flowing and spending set to accelerate, Q4 fiscal policy centers on "accelerating fund disbursement and pushing physical work volumes," using central leverage to stabilize growth while managing local debt risk. Bond supply peaks in October-November as remaining ultra-long special bonds and special bonds are issued, though the focus shifts to deploying already-issued funds. Budget execution will quicken, with spending growth rising and infrastructure-related outlays supported by special bonds, special treasury bonds, and policy financial instruments. However, weak land revenue, debt resolution needs, and project shortages constrain rapid mobilization. An August 21 Finance Ministry statement indicated fiscal-financial coordination policies are optimized, with expanded subsidy scope and higher limits effective August 1, with new initiatives to be launched in H2. Fiscal policy retains flexibility, ready to deploy incremental tools if domestic demand pressure intensifies.

External Tightening Met with Internal Precision Hedging

Early 2026 saw structural rate cuts and relending operations supporting economic recovery. With foreign exchange settlement inflows and ample open market operations, liquidity was loose. Since Q2, external tightening has shifted policy from aggregate to precision tools: price-based measures stayed put, while quantity-based operations changed. Mid-April saw interbank overnight rates fall to 1.2%, 20 basis points below the policy rate, prompting the central bank to reduce reverse repos and drain liquidity via MLF and outright reverse repos to prevent idle funds. The May monetary policy report reaffirmed "moderately loose" policy but removed "RRR and rate cuts," emphasizing "forward-looking, flexible, targeted" policy, briefly alarming markets — concerns eased with resumption of net MLF and reverse repo additions in late May. At June's Lujiazui Forum, the central bank governor outlined plans to tighten the interest rate corridor, introduce overnight repo tools, and optimize temporary overnight operations to implement range-based rate management — a further step toward price-based monetary policy, reducing interbank rate volatility. July's Politburo meeting called for accelerating fiscal spending and bond fund usage, with large outright reverse repo net injections signaling fiscal-financial coordination. In August, amid record ultra-long bond trading volumes, a 100 billion yuan MLF rollover reduction tempered the market, though outright reverse repos were increased to smooth government bond issuance-related volatility. With fiscal funds accelerating in Q4, monetary policy will maintain a "moderately loose" stance, but aggregate tools remain cautious, focusing on precise hedging and structural support. Weaknesses lie in demand, not bank liquidity; RRR cuts would add supply-side funds with uncertain conversion to loans. Government spending directly creating demand may be more effective. During September-October's bond issuance peak, MLF and outright reverse repos will hedge liquidity gaps. The Q2 report emphasized "five major articles" of financial work and support for domestic demand expansion, tech innovation, and SMEs. If Q4 momentum weakens further, structural tools with higher quotas and lower rates remain the preferred option, with aggregate RRR and rate cuts held as reserve tools.

Government Bond Market: Incremental Funds Enter as Buy-on-Dips Strategy Prevails

Q3 Shifts to Oscillation with Curve Divergence

After H1's steady bull run, Q3 saw wide oscillation with curve divergence. Short-end yields were stable, anchored by policy rates, while long and ultra-long ends showed more flexibility on easing expectations, safe-haven demand, and institutional buying. July saw safe-haven flows into ultra-long bonds as equities corrected, with pre-meeting easing expectations driving trading desks aggressively. Notably, allocation institutions bought modestly, indicating disagreement. August's rally was driven by weak fundamentals and expectations rather than pure risk aversion, with funds adding positions. When ultra-long trading heated up, the central bank signaled cooling: a 100 billion yuan MLF reduction — the first in four months — prompted long-end adjustments, though pre-announced reverse repo support cushioned the move. September's announcement of special treasury bond injections into banks and insurers improved sentiment, but funds had yet to enter, leaving the market in range-bound mode. Q3's positives were largely expectation-driven; with policy on hold and allocators cautious, trading desks led, narrowing the trading range versus Q2. Whether Q4 breaks the range depends on renewed coordination between trading and allocation flows.

Early-Quarter Allocation Cautious; Watch for Year-End Breakout

Commercial banks were the core sellers of long and ultra-long bonds in Q3: large banks maintained clear net selling in 7-10 year tenors, while smaller banks rotated profit-taking and added NCDs for liquidity and assessment needs. Insurers were cautious, buying only during late August-early September adjustments (mainly 30-year-plus government and local bonds) and standing aside otherwise. Banks locking in gains and shifting to NCDs, plus insurer caution, reflect allocators' reluctance to chase. Q4 constraints persist: large banks face ΔEVE/regulatory capital pressure — some approaching the 15% threshold — while smaller banks' liability growth slows. ΔEVE strain stems from worsening duration mismatch ("long assets, short liabilities"). Relief options include selling long and buying short bonds to shorten asset duration, raising capital to expand the denominator, or extending liability duration. September's special treasury bond injections into ICBC and ABC to replenish Tier 1 capital should ease ΔEVE pressure (estimated to free about 251.7 billion yuan in 10-year bond allocation capacity). However, the lag between announcement and issuance (three months in 2025) means early-Q4 allocation remains constrained, particularly for ultra-longs. Small banks face liability-side constraints: city commercial and rural commercial bank liabilities grew just 7.1% and 3.7% in Q2 2026, down from 10.0% and 5.5% at end-2025, with deposit outflows and interbank contraction showing no immediate reversal. Insurers received roughly 70 billion yuan in capital injections, potentially supporting 400-500 billion yuan in bond allocation. Yet capital also frees room for higher-capital-charge assets like equities, and with duration gaps narrowing, passive demand for ultra-longs has softened. Thus, injections expand balance sheets but may not translate directly into ultra-long treasury purchases. Attention turns to insurers' asset allocation direction and bond types. With equity-bond valuations near neutral and macro conditions favoring neither, no clear relative value exists. Insurers likely prefer local bonds, long-dated high-grade credit, then ultra-long treasuries — prioritizing yield via buying dips. Wary stance may persist until injection bond issuance begins. Funds, the most consistent Q3 buyer, are at elevated duration; with limited new positives and weak liability growth, upside drive is constrained. Watch whether fund net buying of ultra-longs re-accelerates, but don't overstate single-sided momentum. Wealth management products shifted toward direct investment from outsourcing, reflecting long-end caution. Deposit migration continues, supporting short-to-mid credit, but direct flows into ultra-longs remain limited.

Oscillation Does Not Break Bull Market; Rate Decline Space Opens

Allocation constraints persist in early Q4. With heavy rate bond supply and potential policy bank bond issuance concentration in October-November if financed via market issuances, near-term chasing is limited, suggesting continued low-volatility oscillation. From late November to December, if inflation expectations fade, supply peaks pass, and banks' "early allocation, early returns" demand kicks in, allocation and trading flows may converge, improving ultra-long supply-demand dynamics — a more sustainable trigger for lower rates. Under a neutral policy rate assumption, the 10-year yield range is adjusted: lower bound from Q3's 1.65% to 1.60%, upper bound unchanged at 1.75%, mid-point 1.68%. If the economy significantly underperforms and policy rates are cut, the range could shift lower. Near-term, with supply pressure, large bank ΔEVE constraints, small bank liability growth limits, insurer capital not directly translating to ultra-long buying, and funds at high duration, long and ultra-long spreads will remain elevated. The 30-year-10-year term spread may hold wide, with 30-year yields facing notable resistance at 2.1%, awaiting a decisive 10-year break lower — potentially at year-end. Strategy: position early for the year-end window, primarily buying bond futures on dips.

Report completed: September 21, 2026